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states. 8 While it has never been suggested that agricultural regulation
should be as extensive in this country as it is in England, perhaps an
adaptation of the English program is the ultimate solution to the serious
farm tenant soil conservation problem in this country.
RECREATIONAL INJURIES AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSA-
TION: INFUSION OF COMMON-LAW, AGENCY-TORT
CONCEPTS
Recreation activities sponsored, encouraged or permitted in varying
degrees by employers are a rapidly-growing and important phase of
employee-relations programs in industry.' Accidents resulting from em-
ployee participation in these activities have raised knotty legal problems
concerning the compensability of recreational injuries under workmen's
compensation statutes. Court decisions under the various state acts are
in sharp conflict, and it is difficult to predict accurately a company's
liability for recreation accidents. This is both undesirable and illogical
since the basic coverage formula authorizing compensation is substan-
tially identical in all states.2
The prevailing confusion in the recreational injury decisions is due
in large part to the attempted infusion by some courts of the common-
law, agency-tort concepts of "scope of employment" into the workmen's
compensation requirement that an injury to be compensable must "arise
out of and in the course of employment."
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a master is liable for in-
juries to either person or property caused by the tortious conduct of a
servant acting within the "scope of the employment."'  This phrase, of-
ten varied with "in the course of employment," 4 is used to delimit the
unordered acts of a servant for which the master will be held liable.
While it is relatively simple to state this vicarious liability rule, to deter-
58. See note 52 supra.
1. See notes 122-34 infra and accompanying text.
2. See note 17 infra.
3. 2 HARPER & JAMES, ToRTs 744 (1956); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY §
219(1) (1958). The doctrine that a master is liable for the torts of his servant is gen-
erally attributed to unwarranted dicta by Lord Holt in the early English case of Turber-
ville Iv. Stampe, decided in 1697. 1 Ld. Raym. 264, 91 Eng. Rep. 1072 (K.B. 1697). See
BATY, VicARIous LABILiTy 7-34 (1916). Much interesting speculation has been in-
dulged in as to policies which support the doctrine. See BATY, op. cit. supra at 148.
4. For cases illustrating the interchangeability of the two phrases see, e.g., Olender
v. Gottlieb, 344 Ill. App. 552, 101 N.E.2d 622 (1951); Barnes v. Mitchell, 341 Mich. 7,
67 N.W.2d 208 (1954).
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mine in a particular case whether the servant's act falls within or with-
out the operation of the rule presents a more difficult task. No single,
all-inclusive test has been formulated which will solve the inquiry as to
whether a servant is in the scope of his employment. The courts empha-
size different tests depending on the type of act engaged in by the
servant.'
Nevertheless, the courts do recognize at least four underlying con-
cepts from which specific "scope of employment" tests have evolved:
express authorization by the master,' the master's exercise of control or
his right of control over the performance of services,' direct or indirect
benefit to the master," and the extent to which the master has impliedly
sanctioned improper conduct of a servant? The basis for the master's
vicarious liability rests in each instance on a fault foundation."
Because of a fundamental difference in the basis of liability for
torts and for workmen's compensation, common-law tests for classifying
acts of a servant as within or without the scope of employment are not
appropriate when adopted for determining whether injuries to an em-
ployee arise out of and in the course of employment. In the field of torts,
the legal right to compensation depends on the actor's personal fault-
whether of negligence, wilful or wanton misconduct, or intentional
5. Thus, for frolic and detour see Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 COLUm. L. REV.
444, 716 (1923) ; for horseplay see Horovitz, Assaults and Horseplay Under Workinens
Compensation Laws, 41 ILL. L. REv. 311 (1946); for assaults or intentional torts see
Small, The Effect of Workmen's Compensation Trends on Agency-Tort Concepts of
Scope of Employment, 11 NACCA L.J. 19, 12 id. 21 (1953) ; for dangerous instrumen-
talities see Spangenberg, Agency Problems in Motor Carrier Cases, 6 CLEv.-MAL. L. REv.
130 (1957) ; for the family purpose doctrine see Lattin, Vicarious Liability and the
Family Automobile, 26 Mica. L. REv. 846 (1928).
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY §§ 212, 215 (1958). See, e.g., Kirnard v.
Rock City Constr. Co., 286 S.W.2d 353 (Tenn. App. 1955). Strictly speaking, the lia-
bility of the master is not dependent on the law of agency, but is derived from the gen-
eral rule that one causing and intending an act or result is as responsible as if he had
personally performed the act or produced the result. See RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 870,
876-77 (1939).
7. RESTATEMENT (SECoND), AGENCY § 228, comment c (1958). See, e.g., Van
Drake v. Thomas, 110 Ind. App. 586, 38 N.E.2d 878 (1942).
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY §§ 228, 235, 236 (1958). See, e.g., Ackerson
v. Erwin M. Jennings Co., 107 Conn. 393, 140 Atl. 760 (1928).
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 213, comment i (1958). See, e.g., Baldwin
v. Wiggins, 289 S.W.2d 729 (Ky. 1956), 45 Ky. L.J. 359; Hogle v. H.H. Franklin Mfg.
Co., 199 N.Y. 388, 92 N.E. 794 (1910).
10. Either the master is directly at fault for ordering the tortious act, or he is in-
directly to blame for failing to exercise the right of control so as to avoid injury, or
for knowingly assenting to improper conduct. Even where a tort is committed for the
benefit of the master, recovery is tied to a fault peg: the- employer being benefited is
estopped to renounce the intended benefit. See Small, The Effect of Workmen's Com-
pensation Trends on Agency-Tort Concepts of Scope of Employment, 11 NACCA L.J.
19, 21 (1953).
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wrong. 1 Tort law attempts to equate legal liability with moral culpa-,
bility 2  The justification for the fault principle springs from a sense
of fairness. The actor had a choice: having of his own free will chosen,
a culpable line of conduct, he is morally to blame and should compensate
his victim.'8 Workmen's compensation is a statutory device providing
cash wage benefits and medical care to the victims of work-connected in-
juries through the medium of insurance.'" The financial burden is placed
ultimately on the consumer by incorporating the cost of the premiums in
the price of the product. The social philosophy behind such legislation
is a belief that it is more expedient to distribute inevitable industrial
losses as an expense of production among the community of consumers
who are benefited by the enterprise, than to cast the loss upon a few who
often are least able to sustain it.'5 Losses are paid without regard to the
presence or absence of fault on the part of either the employer or the em-
ployee once the employment relation is shown to exist.16
11. 2 HARPER & JAmEs, TORTS 744 (1956).
12. See 2 HARPER & JAmEs, op. cit. supra note 11, at 752; Ames, Law and Morals,
22 HARV. L. lRv. 97, 100 (1908); Malone, Damage Suits and the Contagious Principles
of Workmen's Compensation, 9 NACCA L.J. 20, 20-24 (1952).
Legal fault does not always correspond exactly with moral fault. In negligence ac-'
tions, for example, the objective standard of a "reasonably prudent man" is used to de-'
termine whether an actor has exercised due care. Many of the actor's personal short-
comings such as awkwardness, faulty perception, or poor judgment are not taken into
account if they fall below the community "reasonable man." Thus, the actor may be
guilty of legal fault for failing to live up to a standard which in fact he may not be able
to meet. See 2 HAR'ER & JAMES, op. cit. supra at 745.
13. 2 HARPERR & JAmES, op. cit. supra note 11, at 746.
14. 1 LARSON, WoRxls COMPENSATION § 1 (1952).
15. See, e.g., Guevara v. Inland Steel Co., 120 Ind. App. 47, 88 N.E.2d 398
(1949). Perhaps the most dramatic statement of this theory is the slogan ascribed to
David Lloyd George: "The cost of the product should bear the blood of the workman."
PROSSER, TORTS 383 (2d ed. 1955).
Conditions which stimulated passage of industrial compensation acts included the
following: a large portion of fatal and non-fatal industrial injuries remained un-
compensated; sums actually paid were frequently inadequate token compensation; re-
covery was obtained only after protracted and expensive litigation; an undue portion of
the premiums paid by industry went to insurance companies for profit. RIESEN FELD &
MAXWELL, MODERN SocIAL LEGISLATION 11 (1950).16. See, e.g, It re Betts, 66 Ind. App. 484, 118 N.E. 551 (1918). Compare Ives v.
South Buffalo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911), in which the New York Court of
Appeals held the first workmen's compensation statute in that state unconstitutional, be-
cause it sought to impose liability without fault.
• The statement that employee fault is irrelevant is somewhat misleading. Compen-
sation statutes of most- states include certain types of employee misconduct as either a
complete defense or a ground for reduction of the amount of the award: intentional
self-injury (41 states), intoxication (39), failure to obey safety rules (20), violation
of a statute or the commission of a crime (9). Eighteen states list "wilful misconduct"
generally as a defense. These statutory defenses have, however, received strict con-
struction by the'courts. See LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 32-36 (1952). The
Indiana, act includes all of the specific statutory defenses listed above. IND. ANN. STAT.
§ A0-120&8-(Burns 1952); SmALL, WORKEN'S COmPENSATION LAW OF INDIANA § 11.1
(1950).
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The basic operating formula of most compensation acts is that an
employee is automatically entitled to certain benefits whenever he suffers
a personal injury or death by accident "arising out of and in the course.
of employment."'" This phrase has been aptly described as "deceptively
simple and litigiously prolific,"" which indicates the difficulty in framing
an accurate, workable definition. 9
To make the task easier, courts have broken the phrase in half. The
"arising out of" portion requires a causal connection between the acci-
dent and the performance of some service of the employment.2" The
causal relation is established when the accident arises out of a risk which
a reasonable person might comprehend as incidental to the employment,
or where the evidence shows an incidental connection between the con-
ditions under which an employee works and his resulting injury.2' In
the latter portion of the phrase the emphasis is on time, place and activity.
An injury occurs "in the course of employment" when it arises within
the period of employment, at a place where the employee may reasonably
be or have a right to be, and while he is engaged in performing the duties
17. Forty-one states and the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act, 33 U.S.C.
902(2), have adopted the English compensation act formula: injury "arising out of and
in the course of employment." 6 Edw. 7, c. 58 (1906); 60 & 61 Vict., c. 37 (1897).
The phrase "in the course of employment" was apparently transplanted directly from
the law of vicarious liability. 1 LARSON, WORK-EN'S COMPENSATION 193 (1952).
North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Texas and Washington require only that the injury
arise "in the course of employment." N.D. Rxv. CoDE § 65-0102(8) (Supp. 1957); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 411 (1952); TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 8306 (1956) ; WASH. REv.
CODE § 51.08.180 (1951). Utah uses the disjunctive "or" instead of "and" between the
two phrases. UTAHa CODE ANN. § 35-1-45 (1953). In Wisconsin, injuries "growing out
of and incidental to" employment are compensable. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.03 (1957).
Wyoming provides compensation for injuries "sustained . . . as a result of" employ-
ment. Wyo. ComP. STAT. ANN. § 72-104(a) (Supp. 1957). West Virginia compensates
for injuries "in the course of and resulting from" employment. W. VA. COonE ANN. §
2526 (1955). The United States Employee's Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 751, uses
the phrase "sustained while in the performance of his duty."
18. Mr. Justice Murphy in Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469, 479
(1947).
19. Professor Batt sidesteps the issue nicely: "It appears difficult if not impos-
sible to give a more accurate explanation of the term than that which the words in their
natural meanings convey, and attempts to do so tend to degenerate into mechanical para-
phrases." He may be quite correct. BATr, MASTER AND SERVANT 373 (3d ed. 1939).
See also the statement by Lord Wrenbury in Herbert v. Fox [1916], A.C. 405, 9
B.W.C.C. 164: "A few and seemingly simple words, 'arising out of and in the course of
the employment,' have been the fruitful (or fruitless) source of a mass of decisions turn-
ing upon nice distinctions and supported by refinements so subtle as to leave the mind
of the reader in a maze of confusion. From their number counsel can, in most cases,
cite what seems to be an authority for resolving in his favour, on which ever side he
may be, the question in dispute."
20. See, e.g., Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418 (1923).
21. See, e.g., Noble v. Zimmerman, 146 N.E.2d 828, 837 (Ind. 1957), reversing on
transfer 137 N.E.2d 233 (Ind. App. 1956); SMALL, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW OF
INDIANA 110 & n.3 (1950). - I .
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of the employment or something incidental thereto.22
Cases are replete with dicta to the effect that both elements must be
shown to exist before an award of compensation can be allowed.2" While
admittedly each element does represent a separate problem, there is neces-
sarily an area of overlap in the meaning attached to each.2" Too literal
an insistence that both tests be independently applied is not consistent
with the universally-acknowledged rule that compensation acts are to be
liberally construed. 5 It must be kept in mind that the basic concept of
workmen's compensation is unitary, not dual; namely, the relationship
of an activity to an employment.
The courts in considering cases relating to the compensability of in-
juries sustained during employer-sponsored recreation have recognized
five criteria or tests as useful for determining whether the injury was
one arising out of and in the course of employment.2 6 The close correla-
tion between these criteria and the common-law tests developed to deter-
mine "scope of employment" will be readily apparent. For convenience,
prior to a more detailed consideration of each, the criteria may be enu-
merated as follows:
(1) Recreation a direct part of the employment or contemplated by
the employment;
(2) Employer exercise of control or direction over the recreation
activity;
(3) Employer compulsion upon the employee to engage in the recre-
ation activity;
22. See, e.g., Noble v. Zimmerman, supra note 21, at 838; SMALL, op. cit. supra
note 21, at 159 & n.1.
23. See, e.g., Noble v. Zimmerman, supra note 21, at 839; 6 SCHNEIDER, WORK-
MEN'S COMPENSATION § 1542, at 2 & n.3 (1948). But see the dissenting opinion of Judge
Dausman in In re Betts, 66 Ind. App. 484, 499, 118 N.E. 551, 556 (1918), who argues that
the two terms "are only different ways of saying that compensation shall be allowable
for every accidental personal injury or death due to the employment." Professor Lar-
son suggests a "quantum" theory "whereby deficiencies in the strength of one factor
may be made up by strength in the other. 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 29.10
(1952).
24. It is commonly asserted by the courts and text writers that no injury can arise
out of the employment which does not occur in the course thereof, although the converse
is not true. See, e.g., John D. Wheeler's Case, 131 Me. 91, 93, 159 Ati. 331, 332 (1932) ;
Hopkins v. Michigan Sugar Co., 184 Mich. 87, 91, 150 N.W. 325, 326 (1915) ; HOROVITZ,
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 172 (1944); SMALL, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW OF
INDIANA 160 (1950). But see Forman v. Chrysler Corp., 102 Ind. App. 408, 2 N.E.2d
806 (1936), 12 IND. L.J. 152. A workman was laid off and told to collect his
pay the following day. He was killed while returning to the factory. The court, in de-
nying compensation, admitted that death might have arisen "out of the employment" but
said that it did not arise "in the course thereof."
25. See, e.g., Noble v. Zimmerman, supra note 21, at 837 & n.1.
26. See generally Noble v. Zimmerman, supra note 21, at 844; Moore's Case, 330
Mass. 1, 4-5, 110 N.E.2d 764, 766-67 (1953); 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §
22 (1952) ; 6 SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 1594 (1948).
NOTES
(4) Employer derives a direct business benefit from the recreation
activity;
(5) Customary nature of the recreation activity makes it an inci-
dent of employment.
Courts vary as to the importance to be placed on each factor. Only
if recreation is a direct part of the employment or if direct employer com-
pulsion exists is a finding in favor of the employee consistently adhered
to. In all other cases, the courts reflect a wide divergence as to the rela-
tive value to be placed on each test.
1. Recreation a Direct Part of the Employment or Contemplated
by the Employment. Where recreation or social activity is an integral
part of the services for which an employee is hired, injuries sustained
while he is engaged in such activity are generally compensable. Social
and recreational entertainment for the improvement of customer relations
is a recognized feature of employment services performed by salesmen
and public relations representatives." Thus, injuries sustained by such
employees while entertaining customers have, for the most part, been held
compensable,28 providing the entertainment had been expressly or im-
27. "No one today criticizes the alert business man who endeavors to row into the
flowing current of success with muffled oars. An illustration is displayed by the pres-
ent case in which an experienced and enterprising funeral director enlisted his assistant
in the membership of an Optimist Club as a good will solicitor incidentally to remind
the sanquine fraternal brethren that the doors of death and of his employer's funeral
parlor were always open. The belief that a live wire would be a dead one except for
its connections has supplied many members to our social, civic, and fraternal organiza-
tions, and crowded our golf courses." Harrison v. Stanton, 26 N.J. Super. 194, 195, 97
A.2d 687 (App. Div. 1953), aff'd, 14 N.J. 172, 101 A.2d 554 (1954). Claimant, the as-
sistant, was run off the road and injured while driving the baby sitter home upon his
return from a Gay Nineties Party sponsored by the club. The injuries were held com-
pensable.
28. Compensation granted: Ocean Acc. & Guar. Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 32
Ariz. 265, 257 Pac. 641 (1927) (female employee injured in rock fall entertaining cos-
metics agent on weekend trip to pleasure resort-case remanded) ; Danico v. Davenport
Chamber of Commerce, 232 Iowa 318, 5 N.W.2d 619 (1942) (secretary of convention
bureau drowned on social outing with potential customer) ; Fintzel v. Stoddard Tractor
& Equip. Co., 219 Iowa 1263, 260 N.W. 725 (1935) (tractor salesman injured hunting
pheasant with son of prospective customer) ; Ohlsen v. J. G. Dill Co., 222 Minn. 10, 23
N.W.2d 15 (1946) (elevator manager drowned on fishing excursion with customer dur-
ing office hours) ; Wold v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 147 Minn. 17, 179 N.W. 219 (1920)
(salesman for auto manufacturer shot and killed by sheriff's posse while pleasure rid-
ing at invitation of local car dealer) ; Harrison v. Stanton, supra note 27; Adams v. East
Pa. Conference, 49 Pa. D. & C. 61 (Schuylkill County Ct. 1943) (pastor injured on
deer hunt with members of congregation); Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v. Strawn, 44
S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) (salesman injured on duck hunt with customers).
Compensation denied: Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 127 Colo. 225,
255 P.2d 961 (1953) (salesman lost an eye pheasant hunting with employees of a busi-
ness customer). It is impossible to reconcile this case with the preceding. Testimony
before the Industrial Board was undisputed that the claimant was allowed reasonable
expenses to entertain customers, and that he had on several occasions entertained em-
ployees of this particular company and been reimbursed by his employer. The Colorado
Supreme Court reversed the Board's grant of compensation, apparently basing its con-
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pliedly authorized by the employer.29 It makes no difference whether the
salesman is doing the entertaining or whether he is being entertained."
The contest winner cases represent another illustration of recreation
activities considered to be a direct part of employment. Compensation
was granted where a salesman drowned while on a fishing trip which he
had won as a reward in a sales promotion contest arranged by his em-
ployer."1 The contest itself was clearly a part of the employer's business.
The fishing trip as the goal of the contest (without it the contest would
have been pointless) was similarly held to be an integral part of the
business plan.
In University of Denver v. Nemeth, 2 the Colorado Supreme Court
was faced with a compensation claim from a student football player in-
jured in spring practice who alleged that he was hired directly and mainly
to play football, and that, therefore, his injury arose out of his actual
work. Claimant received $50 per month from the University for sweep-
ing down the tennis courts; $10 per month was deducted from this
amount for three meals a day in the student cafeteria; in lieu of cash
rental for University housing accommodations the student fired the
furnace and cleaned the sidewalks. The football coach testified that
meals and the jobs ceased when a student was cut from the squad. The
court affirmed an award of compensation by the Industrial Board, but
clusion on an intuitive belief that claimant engaged in the pheasant hunt solely for his
own pleasure having invited the customers merely as companions. In Weston v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 108 Ind. App. 514, 27 N.E.2d 915 (1940), compensation was denied to
dependents of a cattle-spray salesman killed while returning from making arrangements
for a quail dinner for 26 customers. The evidence indicated that on prior occasions
deceased had entertained customers at lunch and ball games and been reimbursed such
expenses by his employer.
29. Compensation was denied to a department-store employee injured while enter-
taining a sales representative at dinner where it was shown that the employee had re-
ceived no authority, express or implied, to entertain out-of-town sellers. Rohlwing v.
Win. H. Block Co., 124 Ind. App. 97, 115 N.E.2d 450 (1953). Accord, United States
Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 43 Ariz. 305, 30 P.2d 846 (1934) (employee
authorized to entertain prospective customers injured entertaining co-employee--compen-
sation denied).
30. See Fintzel v. Stoddard Tractor & Equip. Co., 219 Iowa 1263, 260 N.W. 725
(1935): "Successful salesmanship requires proficiency in many arts. A successful
salesman . . . must be able to accept as well as give. He must be a grateful guest as
well as a generous host . . . . To have declined the entertainment offered, or even to
appear to have accepted it unwillingly, might have jeopardized his getting the contract
which was the object of his visit." Id. at 1267, 260 N.W. at 726-27. For other cases
awarding compensation to salesmen injured while being entertained by customers see
Danico v. Davenport Chamber of Commerce, supr note 28; Wold v. Chevrolet Motor
Co., supra note 28; Adams v. East Pa. Conference, supra note 28.
31. Linderman v. Cownie Furs, 234 Iowa 708, 13 N.W.2d 677 (1944). Accord,
Lawrence v. Industrial Comm'n, 78 Ariz. 401, 281 P.2d 113 (1955) (incentive luncheon) ;
Kelly v. Ochiltree Elec. Co., 125 Pa. Super. 161, 190 At. 166 (1937) (Florida conven-
,tion).
32. 127 Colo. 385, 257 P.2d 423 (1953).
NOTES
,extracted itself from the embarrassing dilemma of holding that- the Uni-
versity was directly hiring athletes to play football. The court adopted
the theory that claimant had been hired to take care of the tennis courts
and do certain other chores, but that football playing was an incident of
this employment as claimant's job was dependent on his engaging in the
sport. Four years later, the same court, faced with a similar fact situa-
tion, denied compensation to the widow of a state college student who
was fatally injured while playing in the opening game of the season."
The court attempted to distinguish the Nemeth case; however, it is clear
that Colorado has now retrenched from its former unique position of ex-
tending compensation benefits to partially-subsidized college athletes.
Compensation was granted to a page employed by the New York
Stock Exchange who was injured while playing on a soccer team spon-
sored by the Exchange where it was shown that employees were, at times,
hired for their athletic prowess. 4 A city fireman required as part of his
employment to exercise while on duty was injured playing handball;
compensation was granted."3  A member of a volunteer fire department
injured in an attempt to set off an aerial bomb at a civic bond rally was
granted compensation where the activity was shown to be a "regular
practice" of the fire department. 6 An employer who delegated the super-
vision and management of the company baseball team to an employee
was held to have made such activity a part of the employment." Simi-
larly, a school principal injured while supervising a prowess test to select
a basketball team was awarded compensation where it was shown that
it was part of his "duty" as principal to select the team."3 A theatre
manager killed while flying in an aerocade to advertise his theatre and
promote patronage was held to be covered by workmen's compensation
where such promotional activities were part of the duties for which he
was employed.3"
Although not a direct part of employment, recreational activities
may have been contemplated by the employment." Resulting injuries
33. State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Industrial Comm'n, 314 P.2d 288 (Colo. 1957).
34. Hoist v. New York Stock Exch., 252 App. Div. 233, 299 N.Y. Supp. 255 (3d
Dep't 1937). Accord, Chadwick v. New York Stock Exch., 252 App. Div. 714, 299
N.Y. Supp. 256 (3d Dep't 1937) (page injured playing hockey). Contra, Ryan v. In-
dustrial Comm'n, 128 Okla. 25, 261 Pac. 181 (1927) (employee hired principally because
of ability to play baseball injured playing catch during lunch hour).
35. Salt Lake City v. Industrial Comm'n, 104 Utah 436, 140 P.2d 644 (1943).
36. Koktavy v. City of New Prague, 246 Minn. 550, 75 N.W.2d 744 (1956).
37. Huber v. Eagle Stationery Corp., 254 App. Div. 788, 4 N.Y.S.2d 272 (3d Dep't
1938).
38. Milwaukee v. Industrial Comm'n, 160 Wis. 238, 151 N.W. 247 (1915).
39. Constitution Indem. Co. v. Shytles, 47 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1931).
40. Factors to be considered in determining whether a -particular activity is con-
templated by the employment include the nature of the accident, nature of the employ-
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-normally will be compensable. One type of recreation case to be grouped
under this heading involves the frequently recurring situation in which
an employee is induced-to accept a particular employment because of the
lure of recreation activities which may be enjoyed. Resort and sum-
mer camp employment is commonly accepted for this reason.
A recent leading case is that of Reinert v. Industrial Comm'n,"' in-
volving a compensation claim by a swimming counselor at a Girl Scout
camp for injuries sustained while horseback riding for her own recrea-
tion off the employer's premises. The evidence clearly indicated that at
the 'time of claimant's interview for the job the availability of recrea-
tional facilities, including horseback riding, was discussed as part of the
compensation for the long hours and exacting work. The California
Supreme Court reversed the Industrial Board's denial of an award, hold-
ing that the injury resulted from participation in a recreation activity
specifically contemplated by the employment and was thus compensable.
Four years before Reinert, the California court had denied compensation
to a college student employed as a dishwasher by a restaurant conces-
sionaire at a summer resort who was injured while swimming in the
resort pool during his off-duty hours." The student engaged in this
activity with the knowledge of and without objection by his employer.
The court in the Reinert decision distinguished this case on the ground
that the recreation activity had not been specifically discussed at the time
of the claimant's employment, that it did not play any part in the salary
for the employment, and that no specific permission to swim had been
given the claimant.
Whether or not expressly discussed by the parties at the time of
employment, however, participation by resort employees in available recre-
ational facilities is clearly contemplated as part of the consideration for
the low pay and long hours. Recent cases uphold this analysis and grant
compensation for resulting injuries.4"
ment, custom and usage of the particular employment, and terms of the contract for
employment. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 39 Cal. 2d 512, 515, 247
P.2d 697, 698 (1952).
41. 46 Cal. 2d 349, 294 P.2d 713 (1956) (4-3 decision).
42. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 39 Cal. 2d 512, 247 P.2d 697
(1952).
43. Compensation granted: Field v. Jack & Jill Ranch, 343 Mich. 273, 72 N.W.2d
26 (1955) (pot and pan washer on dude ranch injured wrangling horses) ; Dunning v.
Park School of Buffalo, 279 App. Div. 832, 109 N.Y.S.2d 246 (3d Dep't 1952) (camp
counselor suffered heart attack after strenuous water polo game) ; Dowen v. Saratoga
Springs Comm'n, 267 App. Div. 928, 46 N.Y.S.2d 822 (3d Dep't 1944) (locker boy in-
jured on slippery diving board at swimming pool).
Compensation denied: Saily v. 500 Bushel Club, 332 Mich. 286, 50 N.W.2d 781
(1952) (dishwasher at resort club attacked by deer while on nature walk) ; Robert v.
Means, 146 Pa. Super. 188, 22 A.2d 98 (1941) (bellboy at lakeshore hotel drowned while
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The use by caddies of golf club links has become practically a uni-
versal custom and is almost a necessary inducement to caddies to work
for a particular club. Compensation has, therefore, been allowed a caddy
injured while playing golf on a day when caddies were permitted to use
the employer's golf course, on the ground that the caddy was engaged in a
recreation activity contemplated by the employment and incidental there-
to. 4 Similarly, where an annual company outing was one of the bene-
fits guaranteed in a wage agreement bargained for between employer
and employees the court held that the recreation activity was contem-
plated by the employment, and injuries sustained were held compensable.4"
2. Employer Exercise of Control or Direction Over the Recreation
Activity. The clearest example of the misuse by courts of common-law
concepts in construing the phrase "arising out of and in the course of
employment" appears in cases where "right of control" is used as a prime
test-or the test-for determining compensability.
In Auerbach Co. v. Industrial Comm'n," the Utah Supreme Court
denied compensation to a cashier injured in an automobile accident while
on a trip to play basketball on a team sponsored by her employer. Claim-
ant contended that the athletic team was an integral part of the company
organization and that compensation should have been granted. The fol-
lowing evidence in support of her contention was submitted: the com-
pany had a separate department headed by a public relations officer con-
cerned wholly with athletic teams sponsored by the company; all expenses
of the basketball team including entrance fees, equipment and transporta-
tion costs to and from games were paid by the company; all money re-
ceived from the efforts of company athletic teams, such as gate receipts
and prizes, was paid into the company general fund; the company ad-
mitted receiving valuable advertising and public good will in addition to
the benefits from increased employee esprit de corps. Five of the seven
players on the basketball team were non-employees who received financial
swimming); State YMCA v. Industrial Comm'n, 235 Wis. 161, 292 N.W. 324 (1940)
(student medical counselor at YMCA camp injured playing tennis).
44. See Winter v. Industrial Comm'n, 129 Cal. App. 2d 174, 276 P.2d 689 (1954);
Piusinski v. Transit Valley Country Club, 259 App. Div. 765, 18 N.Y.S.2d 316 (3d Dep't
1940), aff'd, 283 N.Y. 674, 28 N.E.2d 401 (1940). Contra, McManus' Case, 289 Mass.
65, 193 N.E. 732 (1935) ; Stevens v. Essex Fells Country Club, 136 N.J.L. 656, 57 A.2d
469 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
45. Kelly v. Hackensack Water Co., 10 N.J. Super. 528, 77 A.2d 467 (App. Div.
1950), aff'd, 23 N.J. Super. 88, 92 A.2d 506 (App. Div. 1952). But see Berry v. Colonial
Furniture Co., 232 N.C. 303, 60 S.E.2d 97 (1950). The credit manager of a furniture
company was injured while on an annual company fishing trip. Compensation was de-
nied although the Commissioner had found that "the trip in question was held out as a
part of the remuneration and an inducement at the time of employment ... " Id. at
305, 60 S.E.2d at 99.
46. 113 Utah 347, 195 P.2d 245 (1948).
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payments from the company for all out-of-town games. Finally, as re-
gards claimant's employment, the public relations officer who headed the
company recreation department and "knew her ability as a player" had
originally recommended that she be hired.
In spite of'this uncontroverted evidence, the Utah Supreme Court
reversed the Industrial Board's grant of an award solely on the ground
that claimant was under no direction or control by the company. Control
was interpreted as the right to require performance of a duty to play. 7
Apparently there can be no recovery for recreational injuries under the
Utah Workmen's Compensation Act if the injured employee is unable to
show that he was under a duty to participate in the recreation activity.
The Auerbach case admittedly represents an extreme interpretation
of right of control. Most courts which use the control test are content
to require that the employee be under the supervision and direction of
the employer while participating in the recreation activity."8 The initial
election to participate, however, can be entirely voluntary; the employee
need not be under a duty to engage in recreation before the requisite right
of control is present. Thus, the New Jersey court found employer con-
trol to exist and awarded compensation for the death of an employee
who voluntarily attended an annual company outing where the employer
was shown to have complete supervision over the conduct and actions of
employees who elected to attend."9
Regardless of which interpretation is adopted, however, neither is
correct. In only one area of workmen's compensation does the common-
law concept of control have any validity. Most courts still apply the
47. "In this case, one of the most important elements of the master-servant relation-
ship is missing-that of the right to control the employment. Right to control . . . does
not mean coaching control, the purpose of which is to produce team work when the
alleged employee plays; but means the right to require performance of a duty to play,
if such duty exists." Id. at 350, 195 P.2d at 246.
48. The following cases adopt this less restrictive interpretation of right of control:
Wagner v. Buescher Band Instrument Co., 125 Ind. App. 103, 122 N.E.2d 618 (1954)
(picnic) ; Koktavy v. City of New Prague, 246 Minn. 550, 75 N.W.2d 774 (1956) (fir-
ing aerial bomb) ; McFarland v. St. Louis Car Co., 262 S.W.2d 344 (Mo. App. 1953)
(softball); Stout v. Sterling Aluminum Prods. Co., 216 Mo. App. 537, 213 S.W.2d 244
(1948) (picnic); Fick v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 26 NJ. Misc. 244, 58 A2d 854
(Dep't Labor 1948) (picnic); Tedesco v. General Elec. Co., 276 App. Div. 422, 95
N.Y.S.2d 505 (3d Dep't 1950), re'v'd, 305 N.Y. 544, 114 N.E.2d 33 (1953) (softball);
Barber v. Minges, 223 N.C. 213, 25 S.E.2d 837 (1943) (fishing outing); Kelly v. Ochil-
tree Elec. Co., 125 Pa. Super. 161, 190 At. 166 (1937) (contest winner); Pate v.
Plymouth Mfg. Co., 198 S.C. 159, 17 S.E.2d 146 (1941) (baseball) ; State YMCA v.
Industrial Comm'n, 253 Wis. 161, 292 N.W. 324 (1940) (tennis).
Arizona is the only state which has clearly repudiated the "control test" in a recrea-
tion activity case. See Lawrence v. Industrial Comm'n, 78 Ariz. 401, 281 P.2d 113
(1955) (contest winner attending incentive luncheon).
49. Kelly v. Hackensack Water Co., 10 N.J. Super. 528, 77 A.2d 467 (App. Div.
1950), aff'd, 23 N.J. Super. 88, 92 A.2d 506 (App. Div. 1956).
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control test to establish initially whether an injured worker qualifies as
an "employee" within the meaning of the state compensation act. 0 Once
a worker is found to be an employee, however, all further need for the
control test vanishes. Thereafter, for all workmen's compensation pur-
poses the worker remains an employee; to hold otherwise is to create "a
checkerboard of legal relationships."'-
3. Employer Compulsion Upon the Employee to Engage in the Rec-
reation Activity. The employer by requiring attendance at, or participation
in, the recreation activity brings such activity within the orbit of the
employment. This is true although the activity is outside the sphere of
the employee's original employment.52 The courts have no difficulty in
awarding compensation for injuries where the employee is given specific
instructions to engage in the recreational endeavor. 3
Employer compulsion, however, need not involve a direct order in
the sense that the employee is told either to attend or be fired. The courts
recognize that indirect and subtle pressures may be invoked. by an em-
ployer which are as compelling on an employee as a direct order to en-
gage in the recreation. An insurance salesman with sufficient sales
volume to attend an incentive luncheon given by his employer was in-
jured while returning from such meeting. 4 The employer alleged, inter
alia, that claimant was under no compulsion to attend and that he was
simply engaged in a voluntary, personal mission of his own. The Ari-
zona Supreme Court, in reversing a denial of the salesman's claim for
compensation, stated:
50. See, e.g., Allen v. Kraft Food Co., 118 Ind. App. 467, 76 N.E.2d 845 (1948);
1 LARSON, WoRxmEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 43.10, 44.00-.32 (1952); Wolfe, Determina-
tion of Employer-Employee Relationships in Social Legislation, 41 COLUm. L. REv. 1015
(1941) ; 2 NACCA L.J. 38-47 (1948). Even in this area of workmen's compensation,
however, control as a test for determining the employer-employee relationship has re-
ceived severe criticism. See 1 LARSON, op. cit. supra at 628-37 (1952).
Since the control test stems from tort law with its principle of fault, and since fault
has been abolished under workmen's compensation !aws, most courts properly have
liberalized the control test by providing that doubt is to be resolved in favor of the
injured worker-that is, in favor of his status as an employee. See, e.g., Sprout & Davis
v. Toren, 118 Ind. App. 384, 78 N.E.2d 437 (1948) ; 2 NACCA L.J. 41 (1948).
51. Justice Smith dissenting in Salmon v. Bagley Laundry Co., 344 Mich. 471, 485,
74 N.W.2d 1, 18 (1955).
52. Compare the first test discussed which grants compensation where recreation
is a direct part of the employment at the time the employee is initially hired.
53. See, e.g., Stakonis v. United Advertising Co., 110 Conn. 384, 148 Ati. 334 (1930)
(picnic) ; Stockley v. School Dist., 231 Mich. 523, 204 N.W. 715 (1925) (teacher's in-
stitute); Sinclair v. Wallach Laundry, 252 App. Div. 715, 298 N.Y. Supp. 686 (1937)
(salesman attending combination dinner and rug cleaning demonstration); Miller v.
Keystone Appliances, 133 Pa. Super. 354, 2 A.2d 508 (1938) (picnic).
54. Lawrence v. Industrial Comm'n, 78 Ariz. 401, 281 P.2d 113 (1955).
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The degree of pressure which the employer must be shown
to exert in order to find that he directed an employee in a given
action must not be a requirement which ignores the realities of
business. The superior position of the employer permits com-
pulsion to be exerted indirectly. While a suggestion or en-
couragement may be substituted for the command it would be
unrealistic to fail to recognize that the force of such substi-
tutes may equal that of an express order.55
The court concluded that the employer had chosen to motivate his em-
ployees by incentive which was the equivalent of compulsion. Compen-
sation was awarded on the ground of employer compulsion to a substation
supervisor who received a written invitation to attend the annual com-
pany picnic and was "expected" to attend,56 to a nurse for an obstreperous
child who was "definitely urged" to go cycling to relax," and to a filling
station attendant who was "requested" by his employer to engage in a
friendly boxing match.58
Where personal advancement within a company is closely tied to
participation in recreation activities, courts are more likely to find the
existence of employer compulsion. In the leading Illinois case of Jewel
Tea Co. v. Industrial Comn'n,5" compensation was granted to an em-
ployee injured while playing softball in an intra-company league. Each
company district in the Chicago area fielded one team, with the district
manager appointing a captain. Teams were named after the district
manager. Claimant had played on this particular team in prior years
but had decided not to play this season. The team captain, however, af-
ter accusing claimant of lacking company spirit secured his reluctant
consent. The court recognized that the moral suasion exerted by claim-
ant's superior who was in a position to recommend promotion was an
important factor in determining whether the recreation was an incident
of employment:
The subtle pressures from the fact that the teams were
55. Id. at 404, 281 P.2d at 115. Accord, Dearing v. Union Free School Dist. No. 1,
272 App. Div. 167, 70 N.Y.S.2d 418 (3d Dep't 1947) (teacher's institute); Wilson v.
General Motors Corp., 298 N.Y. 468, 479, 84 N.E.2d 781, 787-88 (1949) (dissenting
opinion by Justice Conway) (softball).
56. Graves v. Central Elec. Power Co-op., 306 S.W.2d 500 (Mo. 1957).
57. Clapham v. David, 232 App. Div. 458, 251 N.Y. Supp. 245 (3d Dep't 1931).
58. Shoemake Station v. Stephens, 277 P.2d 998 (Okla. 1954). Contra, Cock v. In-
dustrial Acc. Comm'n, 128 P.2d 701 (Cal. App. 1942) (domestic servant was "requested"
by employer to accompany her on automobile ride) ; Fick v. American Mut. Liab. Ins.
Co., 26 N.J. Misc. 244, 58 A.2d 854 (Dep't Labor 1948) (employee was "requested" to at-
tend picnic by superior).
59. 6 Ill. 2d 304, 128 N.E.2d 699, 928 (1955).
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named after the district managers, who recommended promo-
tions within the stores in their respective districts, and the fact
that the district managers came to the games, and appointed the
captain who selected the men on each team, cannot be obscured.6"
Financial pressure is another form of indirect compulsion recognized
by courts. Employer compulsion may be found in sufficient degree to
bring participation in recreation activities within the orbit of employ-
ment if an employer threatens to withhold employee wages in the event
of non-attendance,"' or requires an employee to work at his regular job
if he elects not to attend the recreational function.6
4. Employer Derives a Direct Business Benefit from the Recreation
Activity. One important inquiry by the courts in recreation cases is
whether the employer received or expected to receive a direct business
benefit from the employee's participation in the recreation activity.63 The
courts, however, have found it difficult to determine the marginal line
whereby these values become important enough to establish the activity
as an incident of employment.
The clearest example of business benefit is the direct financial re-
turn incurred by an employer who retains the gate receipts from all
company-sponsored recreation events and collects any prize money won
by company teams. This type of employer benefit has been held suf-
ficient to render the sponsored activity an incident of employment.64
Increased worker efficiency through participation in recreation ac-
tivities, though a more intangible benefit, has, on occasion, been cited by
60. Id. at 315, 128 N.E.2d at 705. But see Clark v. Chrysler Corp., 276 Mich. 24,
267 N.W. 589 (1936), where compensation was denied to a member of employer's plant
police force who was injured while playing basketball in the company gymnasium. The
company vice president had stated that it was his personal desire to have 100 percent
co-operation by the police force in attending three athletic sessions a week in the gym.
A record was kept of those who attended. Furthermore, a specific inducement was held
out to the men to the effect that in the near future active participants would be called
upon to act as instructors in other plants.
61. Stakonis v. United Advertising Co., 110 Conn. 384, 148 Atl. 334 (1930) (pic-
nic) ; Stout v. Sterling Aluminum Prods. Co., 216 Mo. App. 537, 213 S.W.2d 244 (1948)
(picnic) (dictum).
62. Kelly v. Hackensack Water Co., 10 N.J. Super. 528, 77 A.2d 467 (App. Div.
1950), affd, 23 N.J. Super. 88, 92 A.2d 506 (App. Div. 1952) (picnic). But see Fick v.
American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 26 N.J. Misc. 244, 58 A.2d 854 (Dep't Labor 1948). An
employee injured in a one-legged race at a company picnic had been given the alternative
of going to the picnic or working on a skeleton office crew. Compensation was denied.
63. At least one court has concluded that this is the essential inquiry in all company-
sponsored team cases. See Jewel Tea Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 6 Ill. 2d 304, 314, 128
N.E.2d 699, 705 (1955) (softball).
64. Holst v. New York Stock Exch. 252 App. Div. 233, 299 N.Y. Supp. 255 (3d
Dep't 1937) (soccer) ; Chadwick v. New York Stock Exch., 252 App. Div. 714, 299 N.Y.
Supp. 256 (3d Dep't 1937) (hockey). Contra, Auerbach Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 113
Utah 347, 195 P.2d 245 (1948) (basketball).
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courts as sufficient:to bring recreation within the course of employment.
In what promises to be a leading case recognizing the use of recreation
as an inducement to secure business benefit, the Indiana Supreme Court
recently awarded compensation to an employee's dependents for injuries
occurring during a recreation activity immediately following a business
meeting at the employer's lakeside summer home.65 The employer was
an automobile dealer, and it was his custom to hold a monthly business
meeting of the staff after working hours and without extra pay. The
July meeting, originally scheduled for a city hotel, was changed to the
employer's summer cottage because of hot weather. It was understood
by those attending that there would be an opportunity for swimming and
boating. Following the meeting, an employee decided to take a swim
and sustained fatal injuries while diving. The court held that the em-
ployer obtained a substantial business benefit from the sponsored recre-
ation by using it as an inducement to obtain better attendance at the busi-
ness meeting which was admittedly held to improve sales and service of
the employer's automobile agency.66 The recreation, therefore, was in-
cidental to the employment.
In some instances, participation in recreation activities may directly
increase the employee's efficiency in the performance of his duties. Com-
65. Noble v. Zimmerman, 146 N.E.2d 828 (Ind. 1957), reversing oiz transfer 137
N.E2d 233 (Ind. App. 1956). It is difficult to reconcile the Zimmerman case with prior
Indiana recreational injury decisions (all, however, from the appellate court) which ap-
pear to require either the presence of employer compulsion, or that the recreation activity
be a direct part of the employment or contemplated by the employment before compensa-
tion will be granted. See Wagner v. Buescher Band Instrument Co., 125 Ind. App. 103,
122 N.E.2d 618 (1954) (employee injured while voluntarily attending company picnic-
compensation denied); Rohlwing v. Win. H. Block Co., 124 Ind. App. 97, 115 N.E.2d
450 (1953) (department-store employee injured while entertaining out-of-town sales
representative at dinner-compensation denied); Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg.
Co. v. Walker, 119 Ind. App. 309, 84 N.E.2d 897 (1949) (employee drowned while fish-
ing on company premises during lunch hour-compensation denied); Tom Joyce 7 Up
Co. v. Layman, 112 Ind. App. 369, 44 N.E.2d 998 (1942) (member of company bowling
team injured returning from match-compensation denied). In the Tom Joyce case, "7
Up" sweaters were worn by members of the bowling team, and posters advertising the
soft drink were prominently displayed at the alleys. This case is cited specifically by
Professor Small for the proposition that in Indiana, business benefit by itself is not
sufficient to bring an activity within the course of employment. See SMALL, WORCMZN'S
COmPENsATiON LAW OF INDIAIT'A 159 (1950).
66. For other cases granting compensation where the employer obtained no direct
benefit from' the recreation' itself but used it as an. inducement for business purposes see
Linderman v. Cownie Furs, 234 Iowa 708, 13 N.W.2d 677 (1944) (employee drowned on
fishing trip won in sales promotion contest) ; Kenney v. Lord & Taylor, Inc., 227 App.
Div. 831, 237 N.Y. Supp. 810 (3d Dep't 1929), aff'd, 254 N.Y. 532, 173 N.E. 853 (1930)
(female employee broke her wrist dancing at company dinner party where speeches on
salesmanship techniques were given) ; Kelly v. Ochiltree Elec. Co., 125 Pa. Super. 161,
190 Atl. 166 (1937)- (salesmaln killed on return from Florida convention which featured
product demonstrations). Contra, Lehman v. B. F. Nelson Mfg. Co., 193 Minn. 462, 258
N.W. 821 (1935) (employee assaulted while attending movies which employer used as
inducement to obtain attendance at safety lecture).
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pensation was granted for an injury sustained by a golf caddy while
voluntarily engaged in a practice game with other caddies where it ap-
peared that the practice was not only for the caddy's own amusement, but
increased his knowledge of the game and his familiarity with the links
thereby making him more efficient in his job. 7 A machine operator in-
jured while buffing a toy automobile belonging to his daughter was held
entitled to compensation where it appeared that employees were per-
mitted and encouraged in the personal use of the machinery when not
busy with company projects in order to develop new methods and thus
improve the quality of their work.68 An employee engaged in strenuous
work on defense projects in the Hawaiian Islands and given two days'
recreation in Honolulu was awarded compensation for injuries received
while travelling back to the worksite.60
Here was an employee working a seven-day week of over
eight hours a day. The Commissioner could properly infer that
two days' recreation contributed to a higher efficiency in his
employer's wartime work and that furnishing him with trans-
portation for a prompt return to that work facilitated the per-
formance of his work with renewed vigor and is therefore
considered an incident of his employment."
Advertising and publicity values accruing to an employer from the
use of company-name uniforms and the inclusion of the company name
on sports pages or in radio broadcasts are recognized as contributing to
employer benefit. An appreciable amount of advertising and publicity,
however, must attend the recreation before the benefit becomes im-
portant enough to establish the activity as an incident of employment."a
Advertising benefits tend to be substantial when games are played in
public parks with large groups of spectators in attendance."2 Conversely,
67. Piusinski v. Transit Valley Country Club, 259 App. Div. 765, 18 N.Y.S.2d 316
(3d Dep't 1940), aff'd, 283 N.Y. 674, 28 N.E.2d 401 (1940).
68. Wamhoff v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 354 Mo. 711, 190 S.W.2d 915 (1945).
69. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., v. Gray, 137 F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 1943).
70. Id. at 928.
71. Advertising benefits were found to be substantial in Federal Mut. Liab. Ins.
Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 90 Cal. App. 357, 265 Pac. 858 (1928) (baseball) ; jewel
Tea Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 6 Ill. 2d 304, 128 N.E.2d 699, 928 (1955) (softball);
Le Bar v. Ewald Bros. Dairy, 217 Minn. 16, 13 N.W.2d 729 (1944) (softball) ; Tobias
v. Stormco Co., 282 App. Div. 1087, 126 N.Y.S.2d 120 (3d Dep't 1953) (baseball).
But see Tom Joyce 7 Up Co. v. Layman, 112 Ind. App. 369, 44 N.E.2d 998 (1942) (bowl-
ing) ; Leventhal v. Wright Aeronautical Corp., 25 N.J. Misc. 154, 51 A.2d 237 (Dep't
Labor 1946) (softball).
72. See Holst v. New York Stock Exch., 252 App. Div. 233, 299 N.Y. Supp. 255
(3d Dep't 1937) (soccer games played in large public arenas and scheduled throughout
the United States--compensation granted) ; Le Bar v. Ewald Bros. Dairy, 217 Minn. 16,
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advertising and publicity are negligibl6; when the audience consists only
of co-employeesY In addition, whether -benefit is derived from adver-
tising may depend on the type of company involved. In denying com-
pensation to an employee injured while playing. on a company softball
team, a court rejected outright the advertising benefit argument where
the defendant-company was shown to be a manufacturer of railway and
street cars."4 "Obviously, the customers of the company were so few
and widely scattered that the advertising value of the company name on
the jerseys of a soft-ball team would be infinitesimal."75
Generally, the intangible value of improvement in employee health
and morale that is common to all kinds of recreation and social life is not
sufficient by itself to render an injury sustained compensable. 8 As
stated by the New York Court of Appeals in denying compensation for
injuries to an employee during a softball game:
[W]e look in vain for evidence of any business advantage
or benefit accruing to the company from the employees' parti-
cipation in the contests. Too tenuous and ephemeral is the
possibility that such participation might perhaps indirectly bene-
fit the employer by improving the workers' morale or health
or by fostering employee good will.77
Attraction of employees," lower labor turnover," and the creation
of a favorable atmosphere for labor-management negotiations" are other
potential business benefits recognized by courts as accruing to employers
through the sponsorship of company recreation programs.
5. Customary Nature of the Recreation Activity Makes it an Inci-
dent of Employment. Where the recreation activity indulged in by an em-
13 N.W.2d 729 (1944) (softball games played in the public parks of Minneapolis and
occasionally broadcast-compensation granted).
73. See Wilson v. General Motors Corp., 298 N.Y. 468, 84 N.E.2d 781 (1949)
(softball); Konrad v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 48 N.J. Super. 386, 137 A.2d 633 (Essex
County Ct 1958) (softball).
74. McFarland v. St. Louis Car. Co., 262 S.W.2d 344 (Mo. App. 1953).
75. Id. at 347.
76. See, e.g., Industrial Comm'n v. Murphy, 102 Colo. 59, 76 P.2d 741 (1938) (base-
ball) ; Clark v. Chrysler Corp., 276 Mich. 24, 267 N.W. 589 (1936) (basketball) ; Mc-
Farland v. St. Louis Car. Co., 262 S.W.2d 344 (Mo. App. 1953) (softball) ; Stevens v.
Essex Fells Country Club, 136 N.J.L. 656, 57 A.2d 469 (Sup. Ct. 1948) (golf caddy);
Ryan v. State Industrial Comm'n, 128 Okla. 25, 261 Pac. 181 (1927) (baseball).
77. Wilson v. General Motors Corp., 298 N.Y. 468, 473, 84 N.E.2d 781, 784 (1949).
78. See Padula v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 14 N.J. Super. 603, 82 A.2d 225
(Essex County Ct. 1951) (baseball).
79. See McFarland v. St. Louis Car Co., 262 S.W.2d 344 (Mo. App. 1953) (soft-
ball).
80. See Kelly v. Hackensack Water Co., 10 N.J. Super. 528, 77 A.2d 467 (App.
Div. 1950), aff'd, 23 N.J. Super. 88, 92 A.2d 506 (App. Div. 1952) (picnic).
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ployee has become a well-established custom and part of the normal rou-
tine of work, and especially where it is encouraged or condoned by the
employer, the courts are, for the most part, consistent in holding that the
activity has become an incident of the employment. Compensation has
been awarded on the basis of the customary nature of the activity for in-
juries to a member of a surveying crew engaging in target practice,8 ' a
spectator at a lunch-hour basketball game,82 a female employee riding on
a hand truck," a bus driver for a private tourist company accompanying
his passengers on a fishing excursion, 4 an oil well employee hunting
wolves," a graduate research assistant hiking in the mountains, 6 a con-
test winner taking advantage of a free fishing trip,87 an employee at-
tending a company Christmas party,8 and an employee participating in
a lunch-hour volley ball,"9 handball90 or ping pong match."
Spontaneous or casual recreation is not included within this test;
the activity must be shown to have achieved standing as a custom. Thus,
compensation has been denied for injuries to a police chief temporarily
participating in a softball game at the police barracks while waiting for
81. Colson v. Steele, 73 Idaho 348, 252 P.2d 1049 (1953).
82. Kingsport Silk Mills v. Cox, 161 Tenn. 470, 33 S.W.2d 90 (1930). Accord,
Mascika v. Connecticut Tool Eng'r Co., 109 Conn. 473, 147 Atl. 11 (1929) (spectator at
stickball game); Conklin v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 226 Mo. App. 309, 41 S.W.2d
608 (1931) (spectator at baseball game). Contra, Luteran v. Ford Motor Co., 313 Mich.
487, 21 N.W.2d 825 (1946) (spectator at baseball game).
83. Thomas v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 104 Kan. 432, 179 Pac. 372 (1919).
84. Motto v. Cosmopolitan Tourist Co., 278 App. Div. 597, 101 N.Y.S.2d 873 (3d
Dep't 1951).
85. Southern Sur. Co. v. Shook, 44 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931). But see the
more recent Texas case of American Gen. Ins. Co., v. Williams, 149 Tex. 1, 227 S.W.2d
788 (1950), reversing 222 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949), denying compensation to
an employee injured during a crap game on company premises just prior to the start of
work. The employer was aware that crap games were frequently engaged in by em-
ployees and had done nothing to terminate the practice.
86. Rizzo v. Syracuse Univ., 2 A.D.2d 641, 151 N.Y.S.2d 724 (3d Dep't 1956).
Contra, Fireman's Fund Indem. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 39 Cal. 2d 529, 247 P.2d
707 (1952) (cook-housekeeper taking a regular evening recreational walk).
87. Linderman v. Cownie Furs, 234 Iowa 708, 13 N.W.2d 677 (1944).
88. Towle v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 130 N.E.2d 685 (Mass. 1955);
Nagle's Case, 310 Mass. 193, 37 N.E.2d 474 (1941) ; DuCharme v. Columbia Eng'r Co.,
28 N.J. Super. 365, 100 A.2d 707 (Essex County Ct. 1953), aff'd, 31 N.J. Super. 167,
106 A.2d 23 (App. Div. 1954). Contra, F. Becker Asphaltum Roofing Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 333 Ill. 340, 164 N.E. 668 (1928) (company picnic-four year custom).
89. Brown v. United Servs. for Air, 273 App. Div. 932, 78 N.Y.S.2d 37 (3d Dep't
1948), aff'd, 298 N.Y. 901, 84 N.E.2d 810 (1949); Tocci v. Tessler & Weiss, Inc.,
147 A.2d 783 (N.J. 1959) (softball). Contra, Luteran v. Ford Motor Co.,
313 Mich. 487, 21 N.W.2d 825 (1946) (baseball) (dictum); Dunnway v. Stone & Web-
ster Eng'r Corp., 227 Mo. App. 1211, 61 S.W.2d 398 (1933) (fishing); Theberge v.
Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 25 N.J. Misc. 149, 51 A.2d 248 (Dep't Labor 1947)
(baseball).
90. Geary v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 120 Mont. 485, 188 P.2d 185 (1947).
91. Popovich v. Atlantic Prods. Corp., 125 N.J.L. 533, 17 A.2d 492 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
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a state trooper,9 2 a baker engaging in an impromptu game of tag with
two female customers,93 a vice president duck hunting with his salesmen
in lieu of a customary Saturday morning sales meeting, 4 and an employee
who decided to swim a stream instead of using his employer's boat avail-
able for that purpose."
The difficult problem for the courts lies in determining at what
point a recreation activity evolves into a well-established custom and thus
an incident of the employment.98 Knowledge and acquiescence by an em-
ployer in the activity is strong evidence that a custom or practice has
gained sufficient acceptance to become a part of the employment environ-
ment, 7 but it is not conclusive evidence. Compensation was denied an
employee who drowned while swimming a stream to his place of employ-
ment although the employer had prior knowledge of deceased's intention
and had not forbidden the practice.98 No employee, however, had ever
engaged in swimming the stream before.
Mere knowledge of the very act for which compensation
is now sought is not enough to make the injury compensable
if the act, not otherwise compensable, is not part of a stream of
similar incidents which create a hazard of employment. 9
Furthermore, an activity may become an established custom although the
employer is unaware of its existence,"' or if aware, disapproves.' The
92. Donnelly v. Town of Smithtown, 260 App. Div. 819, 22 N.Y.S.2d 332 (3d
Dep't 1940).
93. Lewis v. Capital Bakers, 144 Pa. Super. 171, 18 A.2d 883 (1941).
94. Woodmansee v. Frank Lyon Co., 223 Ark. 222, 265 S.W.2d 521 (1954).
95. Bouchard v. H. E. Sargent, Inc., 152 Me. 207, 127 A.2d 260 (1956).
96. Compare Geary v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 120 Mont. 485, 188 P.2d 185
(1947) (handball-daily custom for three months-compensation awarded), with The-
berge v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 25 N.J. Misc. 149, 51 A.2d 248 (1947) (baseball-
daily custom for 3-10 years during spring and summer months-compensation denied).
One writer has suggested that for the activity to become an established custom it
should have existed at least long enough for a reasonable employer to have become aware
of it. See Note, 24 CORNELL L.Q. 676, 680 (1949).
97. See, e.g., Thomas v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 104 Kan. 432, 179 Pac. 372
(1919) (riding a handtruck) ; Colson v. Steele, 73 Idaho 348, 252 P.2d 1049 (1953)
(target practice) ; Tocci v. Tessler & Weiss, Inc., 147 A.2d 783 (N.J. 1959) (softball).
98. Bouchard v. H. E. Sargent, Inc., 152 Me. 207, 127 A.2d 260 (1956).
99. Id. at 211, 127 A.2d at 262.
100. Where the employer is a modern complex corporation knowledge and acquies-
cence are apt to be constructive. See, e.g., Geary v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 120
Mont. 485, 188 P.2d 185 (1947) (handball-custom known to employer through plant
foreman) ; Colson v. Steele, 73 Idaho 348, 252 P.2d 1049 (1953) (target practice-fore-
man of surveying crew).
101. See Montpetit v. Standard Shade Roller Corp., 277 App. Div. 1066, 100 N.Y.S.
2d 640 (3d Dep't 1950) (water throwing). The court stated that a warning to em-
ployees not to engage in a particular activity does not necessarily rule it out as an estab-
lished incident of the employment. In fact, it would seem that the very showing of a
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controlling issue is whether the particular practice has inr fact become
established as a part of the employment-whether known to the employer
or not.
The preceding analysis demonstrates that in one area of workmen's
compensation the courts have been loath to relinquish the familiar
common-law concepts. In order for compensation to be granted for
recreational injuries the courts, with varying degrees of emphasis, have
required the presence of employer control, employer benefit, or employer
compulsion, or a showing that the recreation activity was a direct part
of the employment or an established custom and thus, by implication,
part of the employment. Employer control and benefit have a fault
foundation and have no validity as applied to the statutory mandate, of
compensation for work-connected injuries. Recreation is seldom one of
the duties for which an employee is hired; it is not realistic to require
that recreation be a direct part of the employment before compensation
can be granted. Nor should it be necessary to fictionalize the recreation
activity as a part of the employment.
The modern judicial concept of compensation legislation should be
based on the premise that the phrase "arising out of and in the course of
the employment" does not have the same limitations as the common law
"scope of employment," but refers instead to the employment environ-
ment viewed from any aspect-its nature, conditions, obligations or in-
cidents. A step in this direction was taken by the Supreme Court in the
leading case of O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc."0 2 The employer,
a government contractor on Guam, maintained for its employees a recrea-
tion center near the ocean shoreline. An employee who had spent an
afternoon at the center drowned in an attempt to rescue two persons
trapped on an outlying reef. The Deputy Commissioner granted com-
pensation, finding as a "fact" that at the time of the employee's death he
was using the recreational facilities sponsored and made available by the
employer, that such participation by the employee was an incident of his
employment, and that his drowning, therefore, arose out of and in the
course of said employment. The Supreme Court held that the evidence
and inferences were sufficient to support the award of compensation.
Workmen's compensation is not confined by common-law
conceptions of scope of employment. . . . The test of recovery
warning or disapproval would serve to establish both the existence of the practice and
the employer's knowledge of it.
102. 340 U.S. 504 (1951), reversing 182 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1950). Action was
brought under the Longshoremen's & Harbor Worker's Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 902(2), the coverage formula of which is identical with that in the majority of state
acts. See note 17 supra.
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is not a causal relation between the nature of employment of
the injured person and the accident. . . . Nor is it necessary
that the employee be engaged at the time of the injury in activity
of benefit to his employer. All that is required is that the
"obligations or conditions" of employment create the "zone of
special danger" out of which the injury arose." 3
The Supreme Court thus rejects the theory that for a recreational
injury to be compensable it must have arisen directly out of the nature of
the work while the employee was performing a duty for which he had
been expressly or impliedly employed. A broader conception of employ-
ment is adopted. The Court recognizes as risks of employment the con-
ditions, obligations and incidents of the work as usually conducted.'
The court also clearly strikes down benefit to the employer as a necessary
test.
The presence or absence of employer control over the acts of an em-
ployee as a test to determine eligibility for compensation was discarded
earlier by the Supreme Court in Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co." 5 To
import the common-law concepts of control into workmen's compensa-
tion, said the Court, would be to invoke "all the technicalities and un-
realities which have marked the use of these concepts in other fields."'08
In formulating standards to determine when recreational injuries
should be included within workmen's compensation coverage, it is
helpful to divide recreation activities into four categories: recreation
a part of the employment, employer-sponsored athletic teams, other
employer-sponsored activities-primarily picnics and social events, and
non employer-sponsored activities established by custom. The basic in-
quiry in all recreation cases, however, will be the same: Is there sufficient
connection between the recreation activity and the employment for the
activity to be regarded as an incident of employment?
103. Id. at 506-07. This portion of the O'Leary opinion has been closely para-
phrased or quoted with approval in the following recreational injury cases all of which
awarded compensation: Turner v. Willard, 154 F. Supp. 352, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1956)
(company bowling league); Noble v. Zimmerman, 146 N.E.2d 828, 833 (Ind. 1957)
(swimming following company business meeting) ; Brookhaven Steam Laundry v. Watts,
214 Miss. 569, 601, 55 So. 2d 381, 392 (1951) (laundry routeman on regular visit to cus-
tomer's home for concurrent purpose of having improper relations with wife and picking
up dirty laundry was shot and killed by irate husband) ; Graves v. Central Elec. Power
Co-op., 306 S.W.2d 500, 504 (Mo. 1957) (company picnic).
104. This theory was first announced in the leading English case of Thom v. Sin-
clair, [1917] A.C. 127, and first adopted in the United States by Mr. Justice Cardozo in
Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk Mills, 229 N.Y. 470, 128 N.E. 711 (1920).
105. 330 U.S. 469 (1946).
106. Id. at 481.
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Where the recreation engaged in is a direct part of the employment
services, either as a duty of the employee or a form of consideration paid
by the employer, injuries sustained by an employee should be compens-
able. Salesmen entertaining customers, low-paid summer resort em-
ployees and golf caddies are included within this category.
Injuries sustained by employees while participating on company-
sponsored athletic teams or while attending picnics or other social events
should be compensable where there is some financial assistance by the
employer, or where employer encouragement borders on compulsion.
This determination is a question of fact and depends on the circumstances
involved in each particular case.
Most companies sponsoring competitive athletic teams contribute
direct financial support in varying degrees by supplying equipment and
uniforms, paying entrance and playing fees and transportation costs,
awarding player bonuses, or furnishing end-of-season banquets and
prizes. Indirect contributions appear when the company employs a paid
recreation director, allows time off with pay for practices and games,
rearranges employee schedules to fit in with athletic events, sanctions
conferences of team captains on company time, permits the use of com-
pany premises or facilities for recreation or the storage of equipment, or
publicizes the activities in the company newspaper or through radio broad-
casts. As regards financial support of non-athletic social activities, a
survey following the 1957 picnic season indicates that over 89% of the
companies sponsoring outings paid 50% or more of the costs.l"' Ad-
mittedly, corporate management is charged with the affirmative duty
of furthering the interests of the company. Employers do not attempt
to make gratuitous contributions for noncorporate purposes. Thus, direct
or indirect expenditures of company funds for recreational activities
raises a strong presumption that such activities have been annexed by the
company as a business incident of the employment. This factor has been
recognized by courts in recent cases."0 8
A second factor to be evaluated in determining whether company-
sponsored recreation has become an incident of employment relates to
107. See Annual Picnic-Most Popular Recreation Activity, 1 RECREATION MAN-
AGEMENT 8, 9 (1958). Only 3% of the companies reported contributing nothing to the
cost of the company picnic. Ibid.
108. See Jewel Tea Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 6 Il1. 2d 304, 128 N.F_.2d 699 (1955)
(softball) ; Tedesco v. General Elec. Co., 305 N.Y. 544, 114 N.E.2d 33 (1953) (softball) ;
Wilson v. General Motors Co., 298 N.Y. 468, 84 N.E.2d 781 (1949) (dissenting opinion)
(softball) ; Holst v. New York Stock Exch., 252 App. Div. 233, 299 N.Y. Supp. 255 (3d
Dep't 1937) (soccer). But see Wooten v. Roden, 260 Ala. 606, 71 So. 2d 802 (1954)(company Christmas party-compensation denied). All expenses of the party were paid
by the company and placed on the books as a business expense for income tax purposes.
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employer compulsion. The courts should adopt a liberalized attitude to-
ward compulsion, recognizing the subordinate position of the employee
and the attendant social pressures inducing his participation in company
recreation programs. An employer who has contributed time, money
and effort to the establishment of a company recreation program ob-
viously expects some employee participation. Although direct employer
compulsion to participate is absent, the failure of an employee to take an
active interest in some of the activities offered may reflect adversely on
the individual's reputation as a "company man." Recognition of this
fact may act as a distinct inducement to the employee to participate.
Non employer-sponsored recreation activities which have become an
incident of employment through well-established custom are, for the most
part, currently compensable and should continue to be so. Where the
activity occurs on or adjacent to the premises and during the regular
working hours or shortly thereafter, an exceptionally strong argument
for compensation exists by analogy to the personal comfort activity cases.
Recreation aside, courts commonly recognize that included as incidents
of employment are a number of ministrations to the personal comfort
and human wants of employees outside the actual core of the job assign-
ment.' Thus, injuries sustained while an employee is satisfying
hunger... or thirst,1 ' seeking fresh air," 2 warmth"3 or protection from
109. Se generally 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 21 (1952).
110. See, e.g., Industrial Comm'n v. Golden Cycle Corp., 126 Colo. 68, 246 P.2d
902 (1952) (truck driver ate lunch under shady overhanging embankment which caved
off); Roos v. Loft, Inc., 33 App. Div. 175, 286 N.Y. Supp. 360 (1936) (chemical en-
gineer helped himself to jar of "peanut butter" on laboratory shelf which proved to be
rat poison); Viltner Mfg. Co. v. Jahncke, 192 Wis. 362, 212 N.W. 641 (1927) (engi-
neer working at hospital given ice cream by janitor from which he contracted small
pox and died) ; Rowland v. Wright, [1909] 1 K.B. 963 (teamster eating lunch in a stable
bitten by stable cat); Blovelt v. Sawyer, [1903] 6 B.W.C.C. 18 (bricklayer who built
wall and sat down beside it to eat lunch injured when his own wall collapsed on him).
111. See, e.g., Vendome Hotel v. Gibson, 122 Ind. App. 604, 105 N.E.2d 906 (1952)
(dishwasher reached into ice machine to get ice for glass of water and lost three
fingers) ; Wasmuth-Endicott Co. v. Karst, 77 Ind. App. 279, 133 N.E. 609 (1922) (cabi-
net maker contracted typhoid drinking polluted water furnished by employer); Jaku-
bowski v. Youngs, 278 App. Div. 599, 101 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1951) (farm hand took long
drink of model airplane fuel from unlabeled jug thinking it contained wine).
112. See, e.g., Corry v. Commissioned Officer's Mess, 78 R.I. 264, 81 A.2d 689
(1951) (receptionist, feeling dizzy, walked onto second floor terrace for fresh air,
promptly fainted and fell over railing) ; Booker v. State Compensation Comnm'n, 113 W.
Va. 657, 169 S.E. 483 (1933) (coal miner injured seeking temporary relief from smoke
and fumes following firing of shot in 'mine).
113. See, e.g., Richards v. Indianapolis Abattoir Co., 92 Conn. 274, 102 At. 604
(1917) (chilly elevator operator dozed off sitting near open fire box of large boiler and
clothing caught fire) ; Codell Constr. Co. v. Neal, 258 Ky. 603, 80 S.W.2d 530 (1935)
(night watchman burned to death in shack where he had gone to warm himself).
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rain,' smoking,"' washing or bathing,"6 resting,"'7 using a telephone"
or a toilet.. have been held compensable as arising out of and in the
course of employment. The wide variety of personal comfort activities
recognized by the courts clearly demonstrates that an activity need not
be a "necessity" to be incidental to the employment."'
The policy argument advanced by courts in denying the benefits of
workmen's compensation for injuries sustained during recreation activi-
ties is that to hold such activities within the course of employment would
tend to destroy company recreation programs.
To so hold would be to serve notice upon all employers that
if they concern themselves with contributing to the social and
114. See, e.g., Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Walters, 287 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1956)
(train brakeman hit head on iron beam under roof of warehouse while running to get
wax paper for use as raincoat during sudden cloud burst) ; Hailer v. Lansing, 195 Mich.
753, 162 N.W. 335 (1917) (fumes in tool house where city workman had gone to eat
lunch during inclement weather exploded when workman lit pipe for after-dinner smoke).
115. See, e.g., Whiting-Mead Commercial Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 178 Cal.
505, 173 Pac. 1105 (1918) (construction worker ignited turpentine-soaked bandage on
his hand while lighting cigarette); Flowers v. William-Rieres Lumber Co., 5 La. App.
49 (1926) (sawmill employee became dizzy from effects of nicotine in chewing to-
bacco and fell from truck) ; Petrie v. Crucible Steel Co., 4 A.D.2d 905, 166 N.Y.S.2d
780 (1957) (eyeshade worn by office worker caught fire while he was lighting cigar).
116. See, e.g., Pacific Indem. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 26 Cal. 2d 509, 159
P.2d 625 (1945) (grapepickers drowned washing in reservoir while on their way to
collect pay check) ; In re Ayers, 66 Ind. App. 458, 118 N.E. 386 (1918) (factory worker
who normally washed up after work by heating water with hot iron bar from furnace
injured on mistaking boiling explosive acid for water); Miller v. F. A. Bartlett Tree
Expert Co., 3 A.D.2d 777, 160 N.Y.S.2d 380 (3d Dep't 1957), aff'd, 3 N.Y.2d 654, 148
N.E.2d 296 (1958) ("pretty grubby" horticulturist attending convention slipped on bath-
tub while cleansing himself for evening session).
117. See, e.g., National Biscuit Co. v. Roth, 83 Ind. App. 21, 146 N.E. 410 (1925)
(bread racker in bakery fell out of window during ten-minute rest period between "oven
runs."); Bator's Case, 153 N.E.2d 765 (Mass. 1958) (employee injured climbing into
hand truck to rest during lunch hour); Kubera's Case, 320 Mass. 419, 69 N.E.2d 673
(1946) (laundry worker struck by automobile while conversing with co-employees on
back steps during ten-minute rest period).
118. See, e.g., Cox's Case, 225 Mass. 220, 114 N.E. 281 (1916) (shoe store man-
ager injured in fall downstairs while answering telephone after normal working hours) ;
Holland-St. Louis Sugar Co. v. Shraluka, 64 Ind. App. 545, 116 N.E. 330 (1917) (em-
ployee injured going to answer telephone call in another part of factory).
119. See, e.g., Hunter Packing Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 1 Ill. 2d 99, 115 N.E.2d
236 (1953) (hog driver sustained fatal shock while using company rest room) ; Vulcon
Detinning Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 295 Ill. 141, 128 N.E. 917 (1920) (factory worker
fell into open trench while relieving himself) ; Schrader v. Monarch Mills, 215 S.C. 357,
55 S.E.2d 285 (1949) (factory worker sustained disfiguring black widow spider bite
while using company toilet); Karlslyst v. Industrial Comm'n, 243 Wis. 612, 11 N.W.2d
179 (1943) (truck driver fell from running board of moving truck while relieving him-
self).
120. See, e.g., Vendome Hotel v. Gibson, 122 Ind. App. 604, 608, 105 N.E.2d 906, 907
(1952), citing with approval SMALL, WOaKMN'S COMPENSATION LAV OF INDIANA §
6.15, at 144 (1952) : "Such acts as are reasonably necessary to the life, comfort, and
convenience of a workman, through personal to himself, and not technically acts of
service, may be incidental to service."
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recreational life of their employees they shall do so under pen-
alty of liability for every accident and injury occurring during
such activities, regardless of the degree of remoteness from the
employment. Under such circumstances, an employer, in his
own self-interest, would probably seek to escape this burden by
withholding all further contributions. 2'
This fear has proved to be groundless as evidenced by the increasing em-
phasis placed on industrial recreation by management.
An estimated 92% of business and industrial organizations now in-
clude some form of recreation services in their employee-relations pro-
grams."' An increasing number of companies now have a full-time
recreation director. 23 Participation in company recreation programs has
risen substantially, indicating widespread acceptance by employees. 2 In
121. McFarland v. St. Louis Car Co., 262 S.W.2d 344, 348-49 (Mo. App. 1953)
(softball). See to the same effect Industrial Comm'n v. Murphy, 102 Colo. 59, 76 P.2d
741 (1938) (baseball); Rohiwing v. Win. H. Block Co., 124 Ind. App. 97, 115 N.E.2d
450 (1953) (salesman entertaining customer); Congdon v. Klett, 307 N.Y. 218, 120
N.E.2d 796 (1954) (swimming in employer's pool); Auerbach Co. v. Industrial Comm'n,
113 Utah 347, 195 P.2d 245 (1948) (basketball).
122. ANDERsON, INDUsTRIAL RECREATION 7 (1955). According to a 1957 survey by
the National Industrial Recreation Association, the major growth in industrial recrea-
tion has occurred in the last six years. Over 37% of the companies initiated their pro-
grams during the period 1950 to 1956. Approximately 72% of the reporting companies
have started their programs since 1940. 1 REcREATION MANAGEMENT 28 (1958). For
a detailed discussion of the growth and development of industrial recreation in the
United States see ANDERSON, op. cit. supra at 38-70.
Well-planned recreation programs are just as important and effective in small com-
panies as in corporate industry. See Recreation Program for Small Companies, 1 REcRE-
ATION MANAGEMENT 22 (1958). Recreation as a type of personnel service is ranked not
lower than third in importance throughout all sizes of businesses. ANDERSON, Op. Cit.
supra at 7.
123. Approximately 50% of the companies with recreation programs now hire a
full-time recreation director, as compared to 48% in 1954 and only 24.6% in 1949. NA-
TIONAL INDUSTRIAL RECREATION AsSOcIATIoN, Reprint from the Wall Street Journal,
Jan. 23, 1957; Survey, Recreation in Industry Makes Forward Strides, 15 INDUS. SPORTS
& RECREATION 9, 13 (1954) [hereinafter cited as 1954 Survey]; NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL
CONFERENCE BOARD REPORT, STUDIES IN PERSONNEL POLICY No. 102, EMPLOYEE RECREA-
TION ACTIVITIES 25 (1949) [hereinafter cited as 1949 CONFERENCE BD. REPORT].
124. The trend of employee participation in recreational activities for the five year
period 1949-1954 is listed below:
Percent Participation 1954 1949




Under 20% 3 15
1954 Survey 11.
A United States Bureau of Labor Statistics Bulletin in 1919 showed 23% employee
participation in indoor recreation facilities furnished by 51.2% of the companies sur-
veyed; 50.8% of the companies provided outdoor facilities. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STA-
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addition, many companies have broadened the scope of their programs
to include the employee's family, retired company workers, and members
of the community. 2 '
The typical recreation program offers a widely diversified series of
activities, a logical outgrowth of increased employee participation. 2 '
One common misconception is to think of employee recreation solely in
the field of athletics. While sport remains the nucleus of all programs,
only about 20%o of the personnel in an average plant are normally young
enough to take part in strenuous athletic competition. 2  The other 80%
must be reached by the company through social, cultural or educational
activity.'28 While the typical company still takes advantage of rented or
TisTics, DEP'T OF LABoR, BUL. No. 250, WELFARE WORK FOR EMPLOYEES IN INDUSTRIAL
ESTABLISHMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 7 (1919).
125. According to the 1949 CONFERENCE BD. REPORT, families were invited to par-
ticipate in 70% of the total number of activities available to employees. Id. at 13. Rec-
reation activities were open to the entire community in 6% of the companies surveyed.
Ibid. By 1954, however, 32% of the companies were including the general community in
one or more of their program activities. 1954 Survey 11.
126. The companies surveyed in 1949 reported a total of 158 different employee
recreation activities. 1949 CONFERENCE BD. REPORT 9-10. According to the 1954 Survey,
one-third of the companies who sponsor recreation programs feature in excess of 20
activities; over 78% of the companies have more than 10 activities. 1954 Survey 12.
For a thorough discussion of program activities see ANDERSON, INDUSTRIAL RECREATION
113-43 (1955).
127. N.Y. Times, April 17, 1955, § 3, p. 4, col. 3. But see Older Employees Cma
Enjoy Sports Too, 1 REcREATioN MANAGEMENT 19 (1958), which indicates that there is
no age barrier for sport's participation.
128. A comparison of the top eleven industrial recreation activities showing how
popularity has shifted in the last forty years follows:
Activity 1957 1954 1949 1926 1916-17
Bowling 94.1% 97% 93.6%
Golf 92.9 90 77.7 3.0%
Softball 90.8 93.6 82.2 51.8* 35.2%*
Picnics 84 64.8 41.1 32.4
Dances and Socials 80 47
Basketball 72.5 85.2 69.3
Christmas Parties 66.7 56.4
Table Tennis 412 51 44.3
Horseshoes 40.8 61.3 50.8
Shooting (Rifle-Pistol) 34.1 51.8 26.5
Baseball 27.9 39.7 47.3
* Includes both softball and baseball.
Bowling has retained its position as the leading recreation activity, though closely
followed by golf. Picnics and social affairs have shown a tremendous growth in popu-
larity; comparable figures are unfortunately not available for 1957 but would un-
doubtedly carry forward the trend. Softball retains its position of dominance among
the more active sports; however, the decline of basketball and baseball indicates the de-
emphasis of sports which require semi-professional skill and in which only a limited
number of employees can participate. 1 RECRzATIoN MANAGEMENT 24 (1958); 1954
Survey 10; 1949 CONFERENCE BD. REPORT 9; U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATisTICs, DEP'T
OF LABOR, BULL. No. 458, HEALTH AND RECREATION ACTIVITIES IN INDUSTRIAL ESTAB-
LISHXMENTS 45 (1928); U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATIsTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No.
250, op. cit. supra note 124, at 89.
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public facilities, in most instances, there is an impressive and growing
amount of company ownership of such elaborate facilities as athletic
fields, club houses, picnic grounds and golf courses." 9
The majority of companies contribute substantially toward the cost
of recreation programs.' Some 50,000 companies are estimated to have
spent in excess of $1 billion during 1957 for recreation products, services
and facilities.' The annual recreation budget per employee has in-
creased to a median expenditure of more than $9.1"2 The company share
of the cost, however, has declined, and today industrial recreation is fi-
nanced about equally by management, the employee, and the profits from
129. The following table compares the trend in company ownership of recreation
facilities from 1916-17 to 1954:
Percent Oznership
Facility 1954 1949 1926 1916-17
Club or Game Rooms 45.3% 18.9%
Athletic Fields 41 33 36.5% 6.4%
Park or Picnic Grounds 26.6 25
Bowling Alleys 12.8
Golf Courses 10.5 7.2
1954 Survey 12; 1949 CoNFmENcE BD. REPORT 32; U.S. BuREAu OF LABOR STATISTICS,
DEP'T OF LABOR, BuxL. No. 458, op. cit. supra note 128, at 45; U.S. BUREAu OF LABOR
STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 250, op. cit. supra note 124, at 89.
130. In 1954, 84.6% of the companies were contributing to the operating expenses
of their recreation programs, as compared with 92.4% in 1949. Aside from company
contributions, the most common sources of revenue for recreation programs are playing
fees (53.5% of the companies), vending machine profits (47.5%), club or association
dues (45A%), admission fees (28.2%), and canteen or cafeteria profits (8.5%). 1954
Survey 14; 1949 Co=vRFNcE BD. R PORT 37. Most company recreation programs are
financed by more than one means, the principal combination being company contribu-
tions on a 50-50 basis to employee dues (42% of the companies) plus vending machine
profits. 1 RECRE TIOoN MANAGEMENT 28 (1958).
The degree of company financing in 1954 is indicated below:
No contribution 14.5% of companies
Up to 50% of cost 38.8
50 to 99% of cost 37.6
100% of cost 9.1
1954 Sutvey 14.
131. Industrial Recreation Comes of Age, 1 REcREATION MANAGEMENT 14 (1958).
Industry purchases more athletic goods and equipment than United States high schools
and colleges combined; industry books more professional entertainment than the na-
tion's night clubs--over $1 billion worth in 1957. Ibid. Roughly two-thirds of the $1
billion total expenditure for industrial recreation is spent for equipment and services,
and the balance for administration, overhead and facility maintenance. 1954 Survey 9.
Estimates for 1953 placed the number of companies having active employee recrea-
tion programs at 30,000 with an annual expenditure by these companies of $800 million.
The $800 million expenditure represented an increase of 15% over 1952, and a full 50%
over the estimate for 1948. ANDERsON, INDUSTRIAL REcRnATION 68 (1955).
132. Comparable figures for 1949 place the median expenditure at $5.00. The in-
crease to $9.10 in 1954 more than keeps pace with rising prices. 1954 Survey 14; 1949




Altruistic motives aside, industry recognizes that important values
are to be derived from company recreation programs. Otherwise, it
would be difficult to rationalize an annual expenditure of over $1 billion
by management. Attraction of better workers, reduction of employee
turnover and absenteeism, increased worker efficiency and morale, acci-
dent reduction, a more favorable atmosphere for labor disputes, company-
name advertising through uniformed participants and newspaper pub-
licity, and promotion of community good will represent some of the more
tangible business benefits of an effective company recreation program. 3'
In one type of situation, recreation is recognized by the courts as an
incident of employment. Where the employment is located in a remote
area (usually a foreign country) without adequate recreational facilities
provided by the employer independent recreation activities engaged in by
an employee are considered an incident of employment. Compensation
was gTanted where an engineer assigned by a New York firm to Israel
was shot and killed by Arabs while on a sightseeing trip to Jerusalem ;...
where an airline stewardess was injured while cycling through Lisbon,
Portugal, during an enforced layover of her aircraft;.8 and where a
construction worker at an isolated Alaskan military base was injured
while returning from a recreation trip to a town forty miles away. 7 If
an employer provides recreation facilities for his remote area employees,
then independent recreational jaunts are held not to be incidental to em-
ployment.' Compensation is granted, however, if an employee is in-
jured while using the facilities provided by his employer. 3 '
133. Industrial Recreation Comes of Age, 1 RECREATION MANAGEMENT 14, 15(1958).
134. See ANDERSON, INDUST RAL RECREATiON 10-36 (1955); 1949 CONFERENCE B.
REPORT 47-50; Anderson, A Survey of Research Findings in Industrial Recreation, 22
RE FARCH Q. 273, 276-80 (1951).
135. Lewis v. Knappen Tippetts Abbett Eng'r Co., 279 App. Div. 1107, 112 N.Y.S.2d
79 (3d Dep't 1952), aff'd, 304 N.Y. 461, 108 N.E.2d 609.
136. Gabunas v. Pan Am. Airways, 279 App. Div. 697, 108 N.Y.S.2d 372 (3d
Dep't 1951).
137. Hastorf-Nettles, Inc. v. Pillsbury, 203 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1953). Accord,
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gray, 137 F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 1943) (employee engaged in work
on defense project in Hawaii killed returning from two-days recreation in Honolulu).
138. See Arabian Am. Oil Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 94 Cal. App. 2d 388, 210
P.2d 732 (1949). Compensation was denied an employee working in Saudi Arabia who
was injured while riding to a moonlight beach party (jeep dived off sand dune) where
it was shown that complete recreational facilities, including a swimming pool, were
furnished within the company town. Similarly, in Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc. v. Pills-
bury, 132 F. Supp. 421 (N.D. Cal. 1953), compensation was denied an employee at a
military base on Guam who was injured on a recreational trip for refreshments where
full recreation facilities were provided at the housing area.
139. See O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504 (1951), reversing
182 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1950) (facts stated in text accompanying note 102 supra) ; Turner
v. Williard, 154 F. Supp. 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (construction inspector on Okinawa in-
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The remote area employment cases show clear recognition by the
courts that a certain amount of recreation is not only desirable but neces-
sary for the proper discharge of employment services. When an em-
ployer has chosen to annex recreation activities to the employment either
by affirmative action through financial assistance or active encour-
agement, or by acquiescing in their continued practice, resulting in-
juries should be compensable under workmen's compensation acts.
Furthermore, the rapid and continuing growth of company recreation
programs forcefully demonstrates that industry itself recognizes recrea-
tion activities as an important facet of business and an incident of
employment.
THE INDIANA GUEST STATUTE
In recent years automobile tort law has been affected by the enact-
ment and impact of the so-called guest statutes. These statutes define the
duty owed by the owner or operator of an automobile to one in the
vehicle whose legal status is that of a guest. A guest who is injured in
an automobile mishap in a state which has not adopted such a statute
may proceed against his host within the framework of a common law
negligence action.' However, a guest who is injured in one of the
twenty-seven states which have enacted guest statutes2 must allege and
prove much more than ordinary negligence in order to recover for his
personal bodily injuries.8
Despite a divergent variety of standards expressed in the guest stat-
utes of the different states,4 there is more harmony than disparity among
the state courts as to both the method of approach and the ultimate re-
sults under such statutes.5 The Indiana guest statute and the interpreta-
tion it receives by the Indiana courts are typical of the statutes and court
jured while conferring with fellow employee about bowling league organized by em-
ployer).
1. 4 BLASHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE pt. 1 § 2311
(pern. ed. 1946).
2. Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Indiana,
Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington and Wyoming.
3. 4 BLASHFIELD, op. cit. supra note 1, § 2313.
4. The standards of conduct required for liability are variously described as inten-
tional, willful, wanton, grossly negligent, reckless, and heedless.
5. See PRoSsER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 77, at 452 (2d ed. 1955); Note, 35 MIcH. L.
REv. 804 (1937).
